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Denying the Unknown. Everyday Narratives About Croatian Involvement 
in the 1992-1995 Bosnian Conflict 
 
Abstract. This article, based on the results of focus-group discussions, dyads, 
and interviews in Croatia, examines how Croatians construct their narrative of the 
1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia’s role in it. Despite 
judgements at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
concluding that the Croatian state intervened in the Bosnian conflict, respondents in 
this study claimed to be ignorant of any such intervention. What was discussed 
worked in concert with the dominant Croatian war narrative of Croatian defence, 
victimhood, and sacrifice in the face of a larger, Serbian aggressor. By portraying the 
Bosnian conflict as chaotic and savage, respondents differentiated it from the Croatian 
one and relativised any illicit actions within a framework of nesting orientalism. 
Croatian involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina was generally seen as positive: it was 
viewed in terms of Croatia welcoming Bosniak refugees and providing military 
assistance, which enabled moral licensing with regard to the rarely mentioned and 
marginalised negative aspects of Croatia’s involvement in the conflict. 
 
Ivor Sokolić is a Research Officer on the Art and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC) funded ‘Art and Reconciliation: Conflict, Culture and Community’ 
project at the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. 
 
The 1991-1995 conflict in Croatia, more commonly referred to as the 
Homeland War, forms a key part of the nation-building project of the Croatian state 
and defines much of the country’s politics, society, and culture. The memory of the 
conflict, its interpretation, and the subsequent foundation that it provides for various 
facets of public life are all premised on the dominant war narrative, one of self-
defence against a larger Serbian aggressor. According to this narrative, the existence 
of the Croatian state and the very survival of the Croatian people were achieved 
through an exclusively defensive conflict of an international nature, in which the 
sovereign state of Serbia or Yugoslavia attacked the sovereign state of Croatia. Trials 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have shown, 
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however, that a chain of command (formal or informal) existed between the Croatian 
government in Zagreb and ethnic Croat forces operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 
Awareness and acknowledgment of Croatian involvement in the 1992-1995 Bosnian 
conflict have the potential to undermine the dominant war narrative of defence. This 
remains particularly relevant because relations between the two countries are often 
significantly affected because of on war-crimes allegations against Croats in Bosnia.2  
This article uses the results of focus-group inquiries, supplemented by dyads 
(group interviews with two individuals) and individual interviews, to explore how 
narratives about the conflict in Bosnia interact with the war narrative. This represents 
an instance, ultimately unsuccessful, in which transitional justice efforts had aimed to 
change the war narrative and to lead to some kind of understanding of the conflict’s 
international nature. The analysis examines the narratives certain segments of the 
Croatian public use when discussing the Bosnian conflict, and how they distance 
themselves from it. 
The analysis takes a constructivist view of narratives, in which actors respond 
to cultural factors in their environment and the world around them is ‘talked into 
existence’.3 Such narratives are essentially stories that make the past real and shape 
the understanding of both past and present. 4  They also constitute actions in 
themselves, since action ‘only becomes meaningful in the process of narrating a 
constitutive story of the self’.5  Narratives, therefore, are norms, and by studying 
societal narratives this study also delves into societal norms. Because of these 
characteristics, they are disseminated through interaction, often with counter-
narratives based on ‘opposing’ stories.6 What may have been institutionally produced 
can spread and become stronger within the sphere of culture, art, education, or any 
other corner of society. 
                                                        
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia throughout the text.  
2 For example, in October 2016 ten former members of the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće 
obrane, HVO) were arrested in Orašje, Bosnia, for alleged war crimes. The HVO between 1992 and 
1995 constituted the army of the Croats in Bosnia and in the Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna, which 
was not acknowledged internationally. The HVO was effectively the main Croatian army during the 
war in Bosnia. The Croatian government reacted strongly to the arrests, and up through the present 
relations with Bosnia have remained tense.    
3 Walter Carlsnaes / Thomas Risse-Kapen / Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations, 
London 2012. 
4 Jelena Subotić, Genocide Narratives as Narratives-in-Dialogue, Journal of Regional Security 10, no. 
2 (2015), 177-198. 
5 Christopher S. Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis. A Case Study of 
Finland, Oxford 2008, 11. 
6 Jelena Subotić, Genocide Narratives as Narratives-in-Dialogue. 
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Elite narratives (top-down) are often imposed by either domestic or 
international institutions (political, judicial, economic, military; media organisations, 
etc.) and can ignore cultural specificities that may hamper their work. Therefore they 
are frequently fragmented and not fully endorsed. Everyday narratives (bottom-up), 
on the other hand, are reproduced through networks of families, friends, and smaller-
scale social groups, which are quite powerful in the region. Moreover, the nation as a 
discursive construct is shaped through everyday conversations, choices, 
performances, and acts of consumption.7 The narratives presented and explored in this 
article are ‘everyday’ phenomena in that they are contested and reproduced at an 
everyday ‘site of practice’8 by individuals who have no direct authority over official 
policy but can influence political change by contesting or reproducing the claims of 
those in power.9 
Stanley, together with a range of scholars, highlights the use of focus groups 
as a particularly valuable data-gathering method for this type of inquiry: focus-group 
projects are good at investigating social interactions, which display narratives and 
provide sequences, rather than simply instances, to analyse.10 The perspectives they 
reveal may exist outside of the group setting, but they are more likely to be 
highlighted through social interaction, which inherently includes agreement and 
disagreement.11 Focus-group studies, therefore, are particularly well suited for the 
study of contestation. 
One may question to what extent the narratives that emerge from focus groups 
represent everyday narratives, since they are artificially produced instances of speech. 
                                                        
7  Jon E. Fox / Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Everyday Nationhood, Ethnicities 8, no. 4 (2008), 536-563, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23890181. All internet sources were accessed on 16 November 2017. 
8 Liam Stanley and Richard Jackson, Introduction: Everyday Narratives in World Politics, Politics 36, 
No. 3 (2016), 223-235, DOI: 10.1177/0263395716653423 
9 John M. Hobson / Leonard Seabrooke, Everyday IPE. Revealing Everyday Forms of Change in the 
World Economy, in: John M. Hobson / Leonard Seabrooke, eds, Everyday Politics of the World 
Economy, Cambridge 2007, 1-24, 3. 
10 Liam Stanley, Using Focus Groups in Political Science and International Relations, Politics 36, no. 3 
(2016), 236-249, DOI: 10.1177/0263395715624120; cf. also William A. Gamson, Talking Politics, 
Cambridge 1992; Ted Hopf, Making the Future Inevitable. Legitimizing, Naturalizing and Stabilizing–
the Transition in Estonia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 
3 (2002), 403-436, DOI: 10.1177/1354066102008003004; David Marsh / Su Jones / Therese O’Toole, 
Young People and Politics in the UK. Apathy or Alienation, Basingstoke 2007; Lee Jarvis / Michael 
Lister, Disconnected Citizenship? The Impacts of Anti-Terrorism Policy on Citizenship in the UK, 
Political Studies 61, no. 3 (2013), 656-675, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00993.x; and Liam 
Stanley, ‘We’re Reaping What We Sowed.’ Everyday Crisis Narratives and Acquiescence to the Age 
of Austerity, New Political Economy 19, no. 6 (2014), 895-917, DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2013.861412.  
11 Jane Lewis, Design Issues, in: Jane Ritchie / Jane Lewis, eds, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide 
for Social Science Students and Researchers, London, 2003, 47-76, 60. 
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Arguably, a long-term ethnographic approach would be better suited to the 
observation of everyday narratives in their ‘natural’ setting. The benefit of focus 
groups in this instance is that they can produce a greater number of such interactions 
in a more targeted fashion, since the shorter timespan required allows for the specific 
pursuit of certain segments of society in specific locations. This advantage, together 
with the semi-structured nature of the focus groups, enables a more comparative 
approach than ethnographic research can provide. In this sense, focus groups offer a 
good middle ground and, whilst they cannot highlight everyday narratives through the 
lived experience of participants, they can study the ‘living presence of the past’ by 
showing how it is constructed in social interactions.12 Moreover, many authors have 
highlighted the importance of forgetting, the gaps and silences in memory, as well as 
the methodological problem they present since they are not observable.13 The social 
interaction inherent in focus groups can, albeit in a somewhat forced manner, produce 
these pauses, if not outright silences.14 These breaks in speech tell us something about 
the narratives at stake, and they are made ‘everyday’ or ‘natural’ due to the 
spontaneity that social interaction entails.15 
In total, 52 participants took part in the study. Follow-up interviews were 
conducted with selected individuals to decrease the risk of social context adversely 
influencing responses. Ten focus groups were convened, numbering three to six 
individuals, in addition to three dyads and a further four one-on-one interviews with 
individuals who could not attend the focus-group gatherings. All the sessions were 
semi-structured and took place in Zagreb, Sisak, Zadar, and several non-urban 
locations in 2014 and 2015. Zagreb was chosen since it is Croatia’s political and 
cultural centre and its largest city. Sisak, a mere 60 kilometres to the south, was 
chosen because it was on the frontline of the war, unlike Zagreb, and since it is an 
industrial city it has a large working-class population. The northern Dalmatian coastal 
town of Zadar, also on the frontline, provides a different regional perspective than 
Sisak; moreover, it is known for its right-wing political complexion. The non-urban 
                                                        
12 Carol A. Kidron, Toward an Ethnography of Silence. The Lived Presence of the Past in the Everyday 
Life of Holocaust Trauma Survivors and Their Descendants in Israel, Current Anthropology 50, no. 1 
(2009), 5-27, 8. 
13 Monika Palmberger, How Generations Remember. Conflicting Histories and Shared Memories in 
Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina, London 2016. 
14 Ivor Sokolić, Researching Norms, Narratives, and Transitional Justice. Focus Group Methodology in 
Post-Conflict Croatia, Nationalities Papers 44, no. 6 (2016), 932-949. 
15 Johanna Söderström, Ex-Combatants at the Polls. Exploring Focus Groups and Electoral Meaning, 
Anthropology Matters Journal 12 (2010), 1-16. 
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locations were determined according to the possibility of finding participants, but all 
but one were held in the same regions as the urban locations.   
 
In each location, a group was organised that comprised, respectively, middle- 
and high-school history teachers, members of smaller war veterans’ associations, and 
pensioners. Teachers were chosen since they play a crucial role in the transmission of 
narratives to younger generations; war veterans, since they hold a particularly 
influential position in Croatian society; pensioners, because they have experienced the 
narratives of three different regime types. Snowball sampling was used to recruit 
participants, sometimes with the help of a gatekeeper, who was also a participant. 
This meant that participants referred other potential participants for the study, which 
also helped overcome the general distrust that the researcher occasionally 
encountered. All discussions included a broad set of questions about international and 
domestic war-crimes trials, including those of Dario Kordić and Tihomir Blaškić, as 
well as more general questions about Croatian involvement in Bosnia.  
Dario Kordić and Tihomir Blaškić were indicted in 1995 for their roles in 
events that occurred in the Lašva Valley part of Bosnia. Blaškić was sentenced to 45 
years’ imprisonment in 2000 after being found guilty of committing, ordering, 
planning, or otherwise aiding in crimes against the Bosnian Muslim population in the 
region. In 2001 Kordić was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment for many of the 
same or similar crimes perpetrated in the localities where Blaškić had been operating. 
The trial chamber in the latter case showed that various military units in the region 
acted under Kordić’s direct orders, though he held no formal position in the chain of 
command. In 2004 Blaškić’s sentence was reduced on appeal after his legal team 
successfully showed that, in light of the Kordić verdict, it was clear that Blaškić did 
not have effective control of the troops in the area.16 
The researcher moderated all the groups. An interview guide was used, with 
each of its sections beginning with a broad topic about which the researcher would let 
the participants speak relatively freely and develop the topic as they saw fit. 
Following this initial discussion, the researcher asked more specific questions and 
became more actively involved in directing the conversation, which allowed for more 
comparisons across groups. Prior to the beginning of each group session, the 
                                                        
16  See the ICTY trials of Tihomir Blaškić (IT-95-14) and Dario Kordić (IT-95-14/2), 
http://www.icty.org/case/blaskic/4 and http://www.icty.org/case/kordic_cerkez/4.  
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researcher would outline the aims of the research (withholding no information) and 
provide all participants with an information sheet that described the whole project; the 
participants, if they still agreed to take part, were then asked to sign a consent form, 
which also guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. Only after these preliminaries 
would the focus-group sessions begin and the voice recorder be turned on. The use of 
the voice recorder freed the researcher to focus on the recording of physical gestures 
(such as nods or shakes of the head).  
In some but not all groups, the participants knew one another. This variability 
was an unfortunate result of snowball sampling and its effects are difficult to 
determine. The social contexts of focus groups, in other words the relationships 
among the participants and between the participants and the researcher, as well as the 
more comprehensive social structures within which the discussion takes place, all 
influence the way the data is generated and the nature of what is produced.17 These 
contextual effects have yet to be investigated in any depth, so it was important to 
avoid contaminating the data by paying careful attention to the groups’ composition. 
For example, when interviewing teachers, the presence of a head teacher in the 
discussion may force other teachers to adapt their answers to what they believe their 
superior would like to hear. Avoiding such potential pitfalls was not always possible; 
the non-urban pensioners group included a husband and wife, each of whom may 
have tailored responses based on the other’s participation. Neither member of the 
couple seemed to influence the other, but to further reduce the likelihood that this 
would happen, the follow-up dyad included the husband. At the very least his 
opinions did not seem to change, although this does not account for the wife’s 
responses. Generally, follow-up interviews were used to address this problem, 
especially by targeting the quiet individuals within focus groups. 
In hindsight, focus groups were an effective method of data collection: they 
made it possible to explore the construction of narratives, including the contestation 
and agreement that is inherent to this process. Although disagreement did not 
frequently occur within groups, disagreement across groups allowed comparison of 
how different target segments perceived Croatia’s role in Bosnia. The usefulness of 
such comparisons, however, is limited due to its qualitative nature and to the 
uniqueness of the environment. While the use of focus groups and many other 
                                                        
17 Jocelyn A. Hollander, The Social Contexts of Focus Groups, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 
33, no. 5 (2004), 602-637.  
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qualitative approaches can provide greater depth to a study, which seems necessary 
when analysing complex interactions within politics, law, and culture, they do not 
lend themselves to generalisation and to comparison between cases as well as 
quantitative approaches do. Furthermore, more could have been done in this study to 
produce sequences to analyse rather than instances. The semi-structured approach to 
the focus groups employed in this study allowed for comparison between groups, but 
it did occasionally prevent the free flow of conversation. Particularly quiet groups, 
such as teachers, may have been more talkative in a less structured group and 
environment (for example, in a more informal focus group convened in a café), 
although such an alternative arrangement may have resulted in even more limited 
comparative data. 
During the analysis of the transcripts, categories, if possible, were derived 
from the existing literature to increase the validity and reliability of the analysis. 
When this was not possible, categories were formed so as to account for the highly 
subjective nature of such an endeavour. Given the study’s constructivist approach 
(although this is true in social-science research more broadly), it was important to be 
aware that the interpretation of data is a reflexive endeavour in which meanings are 
constructed rather than discovered.18 The researcher, the method, and the data are 
reflexively interdependent and interconnected.19 The analysis is therefore infused with 
the researcher’s epistemological and ontological assumptions. Moreover, the story 
presented in this article cannot be decontextualised from the researcher’s own 
personal background (a Croatian citizen of Croat ethnicity who has lived abroad for 
some time) and institutional surroundings (a British university where he is studying 
for a PhD, but also the broader academic environment such a project takes place in). 
Different researchers, especially those with differing backgrounds or those looking at 
the data during later time periods, may interpret these categories differently. 
 
Elite Narratives and Croatian Involvement in Bosnia 
The conflict in Croatia lasted from 1991 to 1995 and ended with the 
controversial operations ‘Flash’ and ‘Storm’. The conflict in Bosnia started in 1992 
                                                        
18 Natasha S. Mauthner / Odette Parry / Kathryn Backett-Milburn, The Data Are Out There, or Are 
They? Implications for Archiving and Revisiting Qualitative Data, Sociology 32, no. 4 (1998), 733-
745.  
19  Natasha S. Mauthner / Andrea Doucet, Reflexive Accounts and Accounts of Reflexivity in 
Qualitative Data Analysis, Sociology 37, no. 3 (2003), 413-431. 
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and continued until the end of 1995. It ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Whereas the former conflict witnessed violence on ethnic grounds between Croats 
and Serbs, the latter also involved Bosniaks. Croat forces in Bosnia operated under 
the banner of the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, HVO), the 
official military formation of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, a geopolitical 
entity created with the aim of joining the Republic of Croatia or at least seceding from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ICTY trials of Dario Kordić (IT-95-14/2) and Prlić et 
al. (IT-04-74) provided evidence of this military activity, as well as of the existence of 
a chain of command to Zagreb, formal or informal. In the eyes of international 
criminal law at the very least, then, the conflict in the region was of an international 
nature and Croatian involvement in the conflict occurred outside the territories of the 
Republic of Croatia. This assertion does not change the fact that Croatia and Croats 
were also attacked in Croatia, nor does it alter the suffering of the victims in Croatia. 
It simply means that certain political and military elites in the country had ambitions 
or offered support to armed forces outside the territory of the Republic of Croatia. 
In Croatia, elite and everyday narratives alike (discussed in this article) deny 
Croatian involvement in Bosnia or, at the very least, claim that it was not aggressive 
in nature. This stance forms a cornerstone of the dominant war narrative of defence 
and is inscribed as such by parliament in institutionalised form in the Declaration on 
the Homeland War (Deklaracija o Domovinskom Ratu) of 17 October 2000 and the 
Declaration on Operation Storm (Deklaracija o Oluji) of 10 July 2006.20  
Croatia transitioned from Yugoslav socialism to rule by the competitive 
authoritarian regime of President Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian Democratic Union 
(Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ). Formal democratic institutions were 
primarily a way for the HDZ to obtain and exercise political authority, which meant 
that conventional standards of democracy were not met. Tuđman died in 1999 and the 
HDZ lost the parliamentary elections in 2000 to a centre-left coalition that began 
Croatia’s transition to liberal democracy. Croatia’s first post-Tuđman government 
was initially willing to actively cooperate with the ICTY but, due to a public backlash 
and the threat of certain facets of the war being criminalised, they issued the 
Declaration on the Homeland War the same year they came to power. The 
                                                        
20  Deklaracija o Domovinskom ratu, Narodne novine 102 (2000), https://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_10_102_1987.html; Deklaracija o Oluji, Narodne novine 76 (2006), 
http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2006_07_76_1787.html. 
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Declaration enshrined, in an official state pronouncement, a single interpretation of 
the past, whether correct or not, which paints Croatia exclusively as a victim of 
international ‘Greater Serbian’ aggression; it puts the whole blame for the start of the 
conflict on Serbia (and none on the Tuđman regime); it ignores elements of civil war 
in the conflict (even though this is still being debated among scholars); and, though 
ICTY rulings have asserted official Croatian involvement in Bosnia, the Declaration’s 
interpretation denies that there was any state-sponsored intervention. 21  Moreover, 
binding all citizens, media outlets, and public bodies to accept these points, it elevates 
their status and places them amongst the core values of the Croatian state and narod 
(people / nation). 
Much like the acknowledgment of Croatian military involvement in Bosnia 
could undermine the notion that Croatia acts only in its own defence, assessments of 
Operation Storm have the potential to cause the same effect, since it was an 
aggressive military operation to retake lands (at times this is also how it is justified as 
being defensive, because its aim was to retake lost lands). The Declaration on 
Operation Storm was issued in 2006 in order to pre-empt an ICTY verdict that might 
criminalise the military operation. Unlike its earlier counterpart, it does not focus on 
the core values of the Croatian state, but instead it attempts to define the nature and 
events of the operation. It cites key facts, actors, dates, and goals, much like a 
historical document, although it is not academic in nature since it does not use sources 
or define its terms.22 It was less influential than the Declaration on the Homeland 
War, although it also aimed to create an official version of events that transpired 
during the 1990s.23 Nevertheless, it includes large elements of the war narrative and 
of the narrative that regards Croatia as saving Bosnia from Serbia, a narrative 
repeated at the everyday level: one of the justifications for the operation was that 
‘from the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia, Serb forces organised and 
conducted systematic aggression against the free and liberated parts of our country 
                                                        
21  Vjeran Pavlaković, Fulfilling the Thousand-Year-Old Dream. Strategies of Symbolic Nation-
Building in Croatia, in: Pål Kolstø, ed., Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in South Eastern 
Europe, Farnham 2014, 19-50. 
22 Snježana Koren, ‘Korisna prošlost’? Ratovi devetesetih u deklaracijama hrvatskog sabora (Useful 
Past? The Wars of the Nineties in the Declarations of the Croatian Sabor), in: Tihomir Cipek, ed., 
Kultura sjećanja: 1991. Povijesni lomovi i svladanje prošlosti (Culture of Memory: 1991. Historical 
Breaks and Overcoming the Past), Zagreb 2011, 123-156. 
23 Snježana Koren, Useful Past? The Wars of the Nineties in the Declarations of the Croatian Sabor, in: 
Tihomir Cipek, ed., Culture of Memory: 1991. Historical Breaks and Overcoming the Past. 
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and neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Article 1).24 Article 2 focusses on the 
legally legitimate nature of the operation, but also on cooperation with the 
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement 
specifically (Article 2).25 Article 5 states that ‘Operation Storm was, by all accounts, 
organised and executed in the last moment, because the defeat of the Serb forces 
prevented a repeat “scenario” of Srebrenica in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
especially in Goražde, Bihać, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Cazinska Krajina and Posavina’ 
(Article 5).26 
This last point of the Declaration is particularly interesting, since it was often 
reproduced (word by word with regard to Bihać) by members of the focus groups. 
Overall the Declaration presented a change of tactics from its earlier counterpart, 
since it no longer focussed so much on defence (it is more focussed on the response to 
aggression) and instead centred on cooperation with Bosnia as well as allies in the 
West, thereby countering any arguments over Croatian aggression in the neighbouring 
state. Despite being the less influential of the two declarations, it still enshrined facets 
of the war narrative in writing, thereby quasi-legally undermining competing 
narratives from judicial institutions. Elements of it were reflected in the focus-group 
discussions. 
The dominant war narrative has several key components. First and foremost is 
defence. The conflict is seen as an act of self-defence against an aggressor.27 As 
Pavlaković notes, even the Croatian word for war veterans of the Homeland War is 
branitelji, or ‘defenders’, reinforcing this notion of defence. Second, the war narrative 
draws forth emotional reactions, based on symbols of struggle. 28  In Croatia the 
framing involves the idea that the fledgling state was unprepared and unarmed for the 
coming conflict. 29  Third, since Croatia is seen as having acted in self-defence, 
aggressors must exist. These are frequently referred to as ‘Serbs/Serbia’, ‘Greater 
                                                        
24 Declaration on Operation Storm (Deklaracija o Oluji).  
25 The Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement refers to the Split Agreement of July 1995 signed by Croatia, 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
established military cooperation primarily to relieve the siege of Bihać.  
26 Declaration on Operation Storm (Deklaracija o Oluji).  
27 Dejan Jović, Croatia After Tudjman. The ICTY and Issues of Transitional Justice, Chaillot Paper no. 
116, Paris 2009, 13-27.  
28 Pavlaković, Fulfilling the Thousand-Year-Old Dream. 
29  Tamara Banjeglav, Conflicting Memories, Competing Narratives and Contested Histories in 
Croatia’s Post­War Commemorative Practices, Politička Misao 49, no. 5 (2012), 7-31; Victor Peskin / 
Mieczysłav Boduszynski, International Justice and Domestic Politics. Post-Tudjman Croatia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 7 (2003), 
1117-1142, DOI: 10.1080/0966813032000130710.  
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Serbs/Serbia’, ‘JNA’, ‘Chetniks’, ‘communists’, or any combination of these words, 
both in Croatia and in Bosnia. Fourth is the notion of Croatian victimhood built 
around several Croatian focal points, such as Vukovar and Dubrovnik, whose 
destruction was decried across the whole of Croatian society.30 Further symbols are 
war crimes committed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska narodna 
armija, JNA) and associated paramilitary groups as well as acts of destruction in other 
localities, which are more locally emphasised (for example, the attacks on Sisak and 
Zadar, murders in Petrinja, Glina, Škabrnja, and so on). This component was reflected 
in the importance Croatian elites attributed to the Croatia–Serbia International Court 
of Justice genocide case. Their unhappiness with the final ruling (the case was 
dismissed) focussed on the lack of recognition given to the amount of suffering and 
the level of victimhood experienced by Croatia. This ruling potentially undermined 
the Croatian interpretation of events, since it belittled Croatian victimhood; and yet 
the dismissal of the Serbian claim to genocide also reinforced the interpretation that 
Operation Storm was a legitimate military operation.31 The narrative of the Croatian 
self is complex and multilayered, despite being centred on several similar themes, 
which stands in stark contrast to the reductionist construction of the Bosnian ‘other’ in 
Croatia. 
The effect of the narrative and of the declaration on everyday narratives is 
discussed below, but its effect on the elite level is best exemplified by a 2001 
parliamentary exchange between Vesna Pusić of the leftist Croatian People’s Party 
(Hrvatska narodna strana, HNS)32 and several members of parliament: Vladimir Šeks 
and Ivo Sanader of the HDZ and Zdravko Tomac of the Social Democratic Party of 
Croatia (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP).33 The heated exchange began 
when Pusić proclaimed that she, personally, speaking not on behalf of her party, 
believed that the Homeland War waged in Croatia was positive, but that it should not 
have been fought outside the territories of Croatia, namely in Bosnia. Her comments 
resulted in an avalanche of retorts, with one member of parliament quoting the 
                                                        
30 Banjeglav, Conflicting Memories, Competing Narratives and Contested Histories; Jović, Croatia 
After Tudjman; Pavlaković, Fulfilling the Thousand-year-old Dream. 
31 International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/118. 
32 She later served as first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign and European affairs in a 
centre-left coalition under prime minister Zoran Milanović (2012-2016). 
33 Ivo Sanader later became prime minister of Croatia. Tomac was always far more nationalistically 
oriented than most of his fellow party members and closely aligned himself with HDZ policies during 
the 1990s. He was highly critical of the ICTY and formally left the party in 2003.  
 12 
Declaration on the Homeland War, stressing that it clearly states that Croatia had led a 
defensive, liberating war, not an aggressive conquest. Another member of parliament 
complained that Pusić was incorrect since the Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement had 
made Croatian military action in Bosnia legitimate (this claim was often repeated in 
the focus groups across all target segments). Several members agreed, to which Pusić 
responded that she had the right to her own opinion, including on the Declaration, and 
that she believed that the HDZ government, under Tuđman’s leadership throughout 
the conflict, had waged an aggressive war in Bosnia. The ensuing reaction was 
possibly most telling of all: Vladimir Šeks requested that the parliamentary session be 
paused due to Pusić’s insults and the speaker of the parliament asked her to apologise 
to the entire parliament for belittling the Declaration on the Homeland War, a demand 
ratified by a vote. Refusing to comply, Pusić was given an official warning. Punitive 
actions, such as the demand for an apology and the official warning, show the direct 
policy implications of the narratives and how they limit what is considered 
acceptable, even legal, in the Croatian political sphere. 
The incident, although it occurred in 2001, is emblematic of the war 
narrative’s current predominance and its commonly used symbols. It also shows the 
interaction between an emotional narrative and legal reasoning. Because the war 
narrative forms a key part of Croatia’s nation-building and state-building projects, the 
understanding that Croatia was involved in an aggressive conflict in Bosnia has the 
potential to undermine these processes and, in the eyes of some, the legitimacy of the 
modern Croatian state. At the level of political elites and institutions, the declarations 
add expressive weight to a preferred version of history and force normative 
obligations on them, which may be reflected at the level of the everyday as well. 
The interaction between these different understandings of the conflict is based 
on extra-legal, or expressivist, effects of the transitional justice process in the country 
and region more broadly. The expressivist aims of war-crimes trials, such as fostering 
pedagogical outcomes or cementing the legacies of the documentation such trials 
leave behind, are seen as particularly important in the aftermath of conflict, as 
opposed to the more traditional aims of retribution and deterrence.34 These aims have 
                                                        
34 Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and the Law, Cambridge 2007; Mark Osiel, Making Sense of 
Mass Atrocity, Cambridge 1998. 
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also been noted in studies of the former Yugoslav states.35 International and domestic 
war-crimes trials, among their numerous goals, have attempted to achieve a sense of 
legitimacy in transition and to draw a line separating the present from the past.36 The 
trial chambers have even stated expressivist goals in their verdicts, such as the 
strengthening of social solidarity and the incubation of particular forms of moral 
consensus in the public. Moreover, this sort of aim was manifested specifically in a 
trial related to Croatian involvement in Bosnia.37 In other words, trials that were 
intended to lead to a different understanding of the conflict and judicial narratives 
were meant to interact with the war narrative. These goals, however, remained 
secondary for legal institutions and in particular for the ICTY. 
Thus the Croatian state, post-2000, could comply with ICTY requests but also 
conduct domestic affairs as it wished and to simultaneously promote a different story 
to domestic audiences, which allowed the state to preserve the nationalist 
understanding of and narrative surrounding the Homeland War and the idea that 
Croatia played purely a defensive role in it.38 Lamont frames this tactic within the 
larger strategy of successive Croatian governments to accept the normative and legal 
framework of the Tribunal system while also occasionally mounting legal challenges 
to specific indictments and investigations. This approach meant that the state was 
propagating countervailing norms that often limited its ability to cooperate with 
Tribunal requests. Despite the prosecution and conviction of Croatian generals, Croats 
continued to believe that their own citizens did not perpetrate war crimes. Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanader and his government regarded compliance as an unavoidable 
legal obligation, but at the same time, before a domestic audience, attempted to 
challenge the Gotovina indictment, for example. Compliance with the Tribunal was 
designed to fit within a broader legalistic strategy of defiance that allowed HDZ–led 
governments to present their formal conformity to international obligations even as 
                                                        
35  Eric Gordy, Guilt, Responsibility and Denial. The Past at Stake in Post-Milošević Serbia, 
Philadelphia 2014; Lara J. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Hague 
Tribunal’s Impact in a Postwar State, Cambridge 2010; Jelena Obradović-Wochnik, Ethnic Conflict 
and War Crimes in the Balkans. The Narratives of Denial in Post-Conflict Serbia, London 2013; 
Mladen Ostojić, Between Justice and Stability. The Politics of War Crimes Prosecutions in Post-
Milošević Serbia, Farnham 2014; Pavlaković, Fulfilling the Thousand-year-old Dream; Jelena Subotić, 
Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, Ithaca/NY 2009. 
36 Ruti G. Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, Cornell International 
Law Journal 38, no. 3 (2005), 837-862, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol38/iss3/9. 
37 ICTY trial of Dario Kordić, ICTY Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-A. 
38 Chris K. Lamont, International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance, Farnham 2010; 
Subotić, Hijacked Justice. 
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they also contested ICTY indictments. Croatia was not unique in this sense. In Serbia 
the ICTY lacked awareness of domestic political circumstances, which curtailed its 
ability to affect the transitional justice process. The Serbian government felt 
threatened by what ‘truth-telling’ efforts could do, such as endanger its stability and 
legitimacy, and these concerns ultimately meant that transitional justice policies 
generally had only a superficial effect.39 In Kosovo, on the other hand, the top-down 
approach to transitional justice focussed on institutions and ignored truth-seeking, 
victim support, reparations, and community-level reconciliation.40  
 
The Unknown Conflict 
For the most part, participants in the study claimed not to be familiar with the 
conflict in Bosnia and, while they were often keen to elaborate on any other topic 
concerning Croatia’s 1991-1995 conflict, this subject was often met with blunt and 
brief professions of ignorance. There was a general lack of willingness to elaborate on 
the topic: participants either ignored the ICTY trials dealing with Croatian 
involvement in Bosnia or were ignorant of them. Not that the ICTY hadn’t tried to 
foster awareness: its numerous efforts to disseminate information had included 
streamed broadcasts of hearings and publication of transcripts, the production of easy-
to-digest case summaries, and endeavours to make court documents and press releases 
generally available, along with other Outreach Programme activities:  
 
Moderator – What do you think of the Dario Kordić trial? 
NU.T.3 – I do not know. I did not follow it at all.  
Moderator – What about the Tihomir Blaškić trial? 
NU.T.3 – He is the one from Bosnia and Herzegovina. I do not know, I also 
did not follow it. (dyad with non-urban teachers)  
 
Such brief answers exemplify the unwillingness to discuss the topic, as do 
long pauses and silences (a benefit of focus-group research is the production of such 
moments), which often occurred at this point in the group discussions. The Sisak war 
veterans starkly showed this reluctance by refusing to speak at all either about the 
                                                        
39 Mladen Ostojić, Between Justice and Stability. 
40 Anna Di Lellio / Caitlin McCurn, Engineering Grassroots Transitional Justice in the Balkans, East 
European Politics and Societies 27, no. 1 (2013), 129-148, DOI: 10.1177/0888325412464550.  
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conflict or the related ICTY trials. Moreover, the notion of a defensive Croatian war 
was itself used as a defence mechanism by the group to avoid difficult topics (a 
recurring feature in these discussions): 
 
Moderator – What do you think of the trial of Dario Kordić? 
SI.V.1 and SI.V.2 vocally protest 
SI.V.2 – I would not like to answer that question. 
Moderator – Could I then ask about the related trial of Tihomir Blaškić?  
SI.V.1 – I would rather not speak about individuals at all. 
SI.V.2 – You asked us about a defensive war, about individuals no.  
Moderator – We can skip it, it is not a problem. 
SI.V.1 – They have their lawyers, a whole team working for them, who are 
familiar with their affairs. 
SI.V.2 – We are just mere mortals. 
SI.V.1 – I would rather not hurt any individuals, I do not want to talk about it. 
(focus group with Sisak war veterans) 
 
This sequence illustrates the fear that the topic of Bosnia can elicit, especially 
in war veterans. The perceived potential to incriminate the Croatian war narrative has 
significant implications, since it can undermine the entire Croatian understanding of 
Croatia’s role in the war, which in turn delegitimises Croatian national identity. This 
understanding is particularly important to war veterans, to whom the war remains a 
central feature of daily life and who define and position themselves in society based 
on shared notions of suffering, victimhood, and innocence. 
The overall effect of this lack of knowledge regarding the conflict, or at least 
the respondents’ claims of ignorance, is twofold. First, it works in concert with the 
dominant Croatian war narrative of victimhood, in this case of Croats being ignorant 
because they are ‘a small people’. This framing can be understood in orientalist terms, 
since Croatian identity is one of belonging to the West without necessarily being quite 
equal members of it. Consequently, within a framework of nesting orientalism 
(discussed below), Bosnians are relativised as inferior to Croats. The second effect is 
that this understanding, in turn, relativises Croatian and Bosnian notions of 
victimhood by making Croatian victimhood real, confirmed, and irrefutable, whilst 
casting doubt on the veracity and legitimacy of Bosnian victimhood. Thus the right of 
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Croats, any Croat, to speak about what happened in Bosnia is removed; it denies 
Bosnians such a right due to their purportedly savage nature; and international actors 
in this context are highly distrusted. No one, then, is permitted to contest the dominant 
narrative. This effect recurred in many facets of how the respondents viewed the 
Bosnian conflict. It is premised on the notion that while all Croatians know that 
Croatia and Croatians were the undeniable victims of Serbian aggression, respondents 
did not know whether Bosnians (in particular Bosniaks and Serbs) could also be 
accorded the status of victim, since they do not know what happened in Bosnia: 
 
ZG.P.2 – In Bosnia all kinds of things happened. It was a dirty war. In some 
places Bosniaks and Croats started together, they tied flags together and so on, only to 
later fight between themselves. In other places Serbs and Croats cooperated to fight 
the Bosniaks, and so on. I do not know much about this. 
ZG.P.1 – This is why I would rather we limit ourselves to Croatia. Bosnians 
can talk about Bosnia. 
ZG.P.2 – That is fine. 
ZG.P.1 – We are not familiar enough with it. Because we were gripped by 
war. In Slovenia and in Croatia. 
ZG.P.2 – But it is all closely connected. Bosnia and Croatia. 
ZG.P.1 – But in Croatia we are not familiar enough with the situation in 
Bosnia to be able to discuss it. 
ZG.P.3 – This is what I wanted to say, that we do not have the right 
information! 
ZG.P.1 – But if you lived in Croatia, then you can talk, you know what was 
happening to Croatia. (focus group with Zagreb pensioners) 
 
This sequence is interesting because the initial premise of a lack of knowledge 
leads to ZG.P.1 insisting several times that Bosnia cannot be discussed, since the 
group does not know enough about it, though they can talk about Croatia. By 
referring to the conflicts in Croatia and Slovenia, the respondent also stresses (over 
and over again) the perceived aggression visited upon the two states. In this manner, 
the war narrative of Croatian defence and victimhood is reproduced consistently, 
whilst acknowledgment or even the mere discussion of Bosnia and Bosnian 
victimhood occurs only in a highly selective manner—only when it complements, 
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rather than contradicts, the overwhelmingly dominant Croatian war narrative. This 
relativisation recurs time and again in other facets of this narrative; and in those 
instances when Bosnian victimhood and suffering is discussed, it is exclusively 
related to aggressive Serbian policies (again, reinforcing the selective nature of the 
narrative). 
In this instance, the elite and the everyday narratives differ. The elite narrative 
stresses the positive nature of Croatian involvement as proven fact, whereas the 
everyday narrative stresses first and foremost the conflict’s unknown nature. Both 
reinforce the notions of nesting orientalism and of Bosnia as the inferior ‘other’: the 
elite narrative through benevolent paternalism (Croatia as the saviour), the everyday 
narrative through a reduction of the conflict by painting it as unknown. 
 
Extreme, Grotesque, and Savage Bosnia 
The Bosnian conflict and Bosnia more broadly were also presented as 
extreme, grotesque, even savage. This characterisation directly or indirectly 
juxtaposed Bosnia (as savage) with Croatia (as not). It also fits into the broader 
narrative that includes Croatia within the Western tradition of civilisation, as opposed 
to (in particular Serbian) Eastern savagery.41  By painting the Bosnian conflict as 
extreme, chaotic, and unknown, individuals were able to more easily distance 
themselves from the reality of the situation. Bosnians (of any ethnicity) were likened 
to savages, much as Serbs were, distinguishing them from Croats. They therefore do 
not belong to the Croatian state, nation, or tradition, nor is their role one of innocent 
victims. 
This phenomenon can be understood using Bakić-Hayden’s theoretical 
framework of ‘nesting orientalism’, in which the label of the ‘other’ has been 
appropriated by those who have themselves been labelled as such in traditional 
orientalist discourse. 42  This sort of othering has been particularly salient in the 
identity politics of the former Yugoslav states, where the people in areas previously 
under Habsburg rule see themselves as being more European than those from areas 
once under Ottoman rule. Moreover, the ‘other’ is often constructed in a simple, 
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42 Milica Bakić-Hayden, Nesting Orientalism. The Case of Former Yugoslavia, Slavic Review 54, no. 4 
(1995), 917-931, 922. 
 18 
reductionist fashion, especially in comparison to the complexity of the ‘self’. In this 
sense, the Croatian war narrative is complex and involves many variations of the 
same themes of victimhood and defence, whereas the Bosnian experience is posited 
simply and exclusively as something unknown and chaotic. The implication of the 
nesting orientalism expressed by participants in the study treated here is a negation of 
the full political, historical, and cultural capacity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 43 
Additionally, if Croatia is understood to have taken part in the Bosnian conflict, its 
participation would delegitimise its self-perception as a civilised, European nation. 
The Bosnian conflict’s construction as chaotic and unknown inherently differentiates 
it from the known and clear (in terms of aggressor and victim) Croatian conflict: 
 
SI.P.4 – Bosnia is too difficult. I know for sure that [the different ethnicities] 
would lend each other tanks when they needed to. For 2,000 Deutsche Marks you 
could rent a tank. I cannot comprehend that war. That is insane, but it is the truth. 
They rent a tank from the one side that has it and use it to fight against the third party. 
And most likely the third party then rents the tank to fight the others. Bosnia is 
difficult. (focus group with Sisak pensioners) 
 
This Sisak pensioner constructs his narrative so that no one in Bosnia is 
portrayed as having been innocent—but no one in particular is guilty either, especially 
when measured against the clear guilt of one party in the Croatian conflict. 
Throughout the focus-group discussions, no clear distinctions were made among the 
various ethnicities. At times Serbs and Serbia were blamed for starting the conflict 
through their aggression; at other times all three ‘savage’ ethnic groups were 
collectively blamed. The narrative that took hold during the early 1990s in Croatia, 
which posited that the Hercegovci (or the ‘Herzegovina mafia’) were to blame for an 
increase in nationalism, was not at all present in the transcripts. This study is not 
representative enough to make any conclusive claims, but such a shift in the narrative 
construction of the conflict may highlight the fluid nature of nesting orientalism.44  
 
Croatian Involvement in Bosnia 
                                                        
43 Bakić-Hayden, Nesting Orientalism, 922-926. 
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The respondents did not discuss Croatian involvement in Bosnia at length, but 
when they did, they acknowledged positive and negative involvement. Sometimes 
respondents would acknowledge both sorts of involvement, but many only discussed 
Croatia’s perceived positive role in Bosnia. Survey results are also indicative of the 
public’s ambiguous view of the Croatian state’s role in Bosnia. When asked whether 
presidents Tuđman and Milošević had agreed to a division of Bosnia in 
Karađorđevo, 45  thereby implying some kind of illicit Croatian involvement, 34% 
answered that they did not know, and 40% answered that they believe this to some 
degree; only 17.1% were neutral and 14.7% did not believe there had been an 
agreement. 46 
That Croatia had played a positive role in Bosnia was, among the study’s 
participants, the mainstream view shared across all groups. This interpretation was 
seen as obvious, official, and exculpatory in relation to the alleged and thus less clear 
negative role. It also relativised and somewhat excused the negative role by providing 
a type of moral licensing. It was centred on two memories: the reception of Bosniak 
refugees in Croatia during the conflict, and the official Tuđman-Izetbegović 
agreement. As discussed above, here the elite and everyday views differ. The elite 
narrative of paternalism (expressing a positive role, with Croatia as saviour) can be 
traced back to the Tuđman period. It subsumes Bosnian cultural, historical, and 
political identity within Croatian identity.47 The everyday narrative does not subsume 
Bosnian identity in the same manner, since its focus is on the unknown and 
uncivilised nature of Bosnia, implying that Bosnian identity is inferior. 
During the Bosnian conflict, Croatia took in a large number of refugees from 
the neighbouring state (surpassed only by the number of internally displaced persons 
within Bosnia itself). The situation put a significant strain on the Croatian economy at 
a time when the country was also at war, but it also worked in concert with the 
narrative of Croatian victimhood and sacrifice: 
 
ZG.P.1 – In my house I had a whole Muslim family from Bosnia. Us Croats 
helped a lot. 
ZG.P.2 agrees. 
                                                        
45 This refers to the meeting held between Tuđman and Milošević at Karađorđevo in March 1991, 
where the two leaders were rumoured to have discussed the partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
46 Ipsos Puls, Izbori 2011 (Elections 2011), January 2012. 
47 Bakić-Hayden, Nesting Orientalism. 
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ZG.P.1 – I have a relatively large house and I took a whole Muslim family. 
We helped. Since we have connections abroad, our Viennese friends brought help. I 
personally took supplies to Kozari Bok, where there was a Muslim camp. We helped 
them. We took them to hospital. No one can say that we wanted this war. And the 
world would have thought very differently had we just let them out over our border. 
Croatia also carried on its back half of the Bosnian war and its armament. I know a lot 
about this. (focus group with Zagreb pensioners) 
 
The Zagreb pensioner highlights how the international nature of the conflict is 
reconfigured to exist only within a domestic narrative of Croatian victimhood. No 
opposing narratives are allowed to exist (the conflict’s international dimension 
notwithstanding). In the sequence, the respondent even relates refugees to the central 
war-narrative theme of unarmed Croatian defence. In Banovina, war veterans 
highlighted how these Bosniak refugees remain in Croatia, thereby exacerbating the 
feeling of prolonged victimhood. In this manner the Croatian role in the Bosnian 
conflict does not contest, but rather reinforces, the dominant war narrative of defence. 
There is also an official nature to the positive role assigned to Croatia in the 
Bosnian conflict, which is embodied in the Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement and is 
directly reflected in elite narratives, such as that of the Declaration on Operation 
Storm. The purported good of the agreement was often a counter to any charge of 
potential negative involvement, since this agreement is seen as proof of both the overt 
help given to Bosnia and the fraternal bond between Croatia and Bosnia. Such a 
characterisation, again, reinforces the dominant Croatian war narrative and is 
reproduced through personal experience: 
 
ZA.V.2 – There was the Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement about a joint defence. 
ZA.V.4 – There was a joint defence. 
ZA.V.2 – We gave them weapons. 
ZA.V.4 – Against the aggression. And at the same time, Croatia is caring for 
500,000 Bosniaks. In Zadar, which is on the front line, ZA.V.3 will tell you, she has a 
summer house on the island, a thousand Bosniaks went there to stay. Artillery fire can 
still hit them, but we are taking the Bosniaks in. 
ZA.V.3 – By Bosniak we mean people of the Muslim faith. So that there is no 
confusion. Bosniaks can be Croats or Serbs from Bosnia. 
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ZA.V.4 – Yes, Muslims. But during this period they are our brothers who are 
threatened just like us. So we are taking care of their refugees. 
ZA.V.1 – I am a living witness because until 1992 I lived among them. My 
husband was Muslim. And I lived among them and in 1992 together with them I 
barely got out alive. (focus group with Zadar war veterans) 
 
This narrative was particularly common amongst war veterans; the sequence 
connecting refugees, the Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement, and Croatian victimhood 
was often repeated. It was, however, also present with the other target segments, who 
equally felt that the world saw Croatia save Bosnia, that the agreement was the formal 
acknowledgement of this act of salvation, and that this role, unambiguously positive, 
was far more concrete and well defined in relation to a potential ‘grey’ negative role. 
The perceived heroism of the Croatian army is probably best highlighted by how 
many participants claimed that Croatian involvement had prevented another 
Srebrenica from happening in Bihać, which is also directly reflected in the 
Declaration on Operation Storm. When the negative role was acknowledged, other 
than being relativised in relation to the positive role, it was also seen as having been 
mitigated by the need to ‘defend one’s own narod’. 
The narrative of Croatia’s positive role provided moral justification for its 
negative role in the conflict. For many respondents, this balancing exhibited itself 
through the stating of the positive role when asked about the negative role, which was 
then ignored or met with a refusal to discuss. Others, however, did acknowledge the 
negative role. This is the only theme that saw significant variation across target 
segments. All groups of teachers acknowledged the negative role, while none of the 
war veterans did. Pensioners were split: those in Sisak and Zagreb acknowledged it, 
those in Zadar and the non-urban location did not. Why this is the case is outside the 
scope of this study, especially since its sample is not representative. Teachers were 
younger and better educated than the other two target segments, and pensioners’ 
groups whose members acknowledged the negative role had completed more years of 
education than those that did not. But neither group can be analysed in any conclusive 
manner. Additionally, as discussed above, the war narrative is particularly central to 
war veterans since it defines their place in Croatian society. 
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The quote by the Sisak teacher presented above highlights how the negative 
role is mentioned in relation to the positive one and how it is considered far less clear. 
In all instances, the negative effects were always somehow relativised: 
 
ZA.T.2 – Given [Kordić] was sentenced, I assume he is guilty. I do not think it 
is a big problem to disagree with the verdict, maybe he is innocent after all, what do I 
know? But it is problematic to welcome him as a positive individual, even though he 
was found guilty. You can then compare that to Gotovina, who was found innocent. It 
is not correct towards Gotovina in the end, or to the victims. 
ZA.T.1 – I agree. 
ZA.T.3 – Bosnia is such a complex topic, I would rather not add anything. 
(focus group with Zadar teachers) 
 
Manifestations of nesting orientalism further exacerbate the disregard of 
Croatian involvement by portraying Bosnia as the ‘other’. Its savageness is used as a 
‘rhetorical screen’ that obscures the disputed notions of state, nation, and ethnic 
identity that helped cause the conflict.48 The social world is divided into two stark 
realms: the civilised as peaceful and the uncivilised as violent. The implication is that 
the latter is made responsible for violence and disorder, and what is thereby ignored is 
the potential for violence in the ‘self’. Croatia is absolved of any possible 
responsibility.49 Participants in the study, and the Croatian state more broadly, deny 
being Balkan in the same way that Bosnia is Balkan, thereby constructing Croatian 
involvement in the conflict as something wholly different than that of its ‘Balkan’ 
participants. Groups that do acknowledge the potential negative Croatian role also 
construct a more nuanced version of the ‘other’ in relation to the ‘self’, thereby 
removing some notions of nesting orientalism. 
Certainly some of the teachers in the study seemed to be aware of the gravity 
of Croatian involvement in Bosnia. A Zagreb teacher highlighted how Croatia was on 
the cusp of international sanctions for its involvement, whilst a non-urban teacher 
highlighted that this issue is ignored in Croatian society and that any narrative of 
victimhood can be misused to hide such issues. Without fail, however, the expression 
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of these perspectives included relativisation in some form, highlighting the potential 




Consideration of the Bosnian conflict has the potential to provide a powerful 
counter-narrative to the Croatian war narrative of exclusive victimhood and defence, 
since it involved Croatian aggression in a foreign state. Among the participants in this 
study, such a counter-narrative has not emerged. Transitional justice efforts, 
especially those of the ICTY, did not have a significant effect on changing dominant 
narratives, and the way the respondents in this study view the Croatian role in Bosnia 
is in great part defined by the dominant war narrative. The robustness of that narrative 
and its dampening effect on alternative conceptions are particularly relevant today 
since relations between Croatia and Bosnia often deteriorate precisely over the 
narrative of the war. Moreover, the recent influx of asylum seekers and economic 
migrants into Croatia has evoked the respondents’ starkest memories of the Bosnian 
conflict: recollections of refugees, in particular Muslim refugees, finding shelter in the 
country. 
Overall, respondents found it hard to comment on the Bosnian conflict, which  
for them represented something unknown. This declared sense of ignorance may have 
been a strategy to avoid the topic: one can hardly expect individuals to possess no 
knowledge of the conflict whatsoever, and the war veterans, arguably the individuals 
most invested in the Homeland War’s memory and symbolism, were those who were 
the least willing to comment and, in the case of the Sisak war veterans, who most 
strongly reacted to the topic. When the conflict was discussed, it was universally 
portrayed as chaotic and savage, which helped individuals differentiate it from 
Croatia and the Croatian conflict, which was clearer (having an obvious aggressor and 
victim) and not savage. This phenomenon is best explained using the conceptual 
framework of nesting orientalism, in that Bosnia represents the ‘other’ to the Croatian 
‘self’. This attitude can be traced to the Tuđmanist legacy as a way of negating the 
full legitimacy of the Bosnian state. 
When Croatian involvement in the Bosnian conflict was acknowledged, it took 
positive and negative forms. The more prominent positive view focussed on Croatia’s 
taking in of Bosniak refugees and Croatia saving Bosnia in the wake of the official 
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Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement. This laudatory characterisation of Croatian 
involvement worked in concert with the dominant Croatian war narrative and 
enhances the notion of Croatian victimhood, sacrifice, and heroic survival in the face 
of a better armed, larger Serbian aggressor. Moreover, it provided a type of moral 
licensing: in other words, it undergirded an apologetic discourse with regard to 
consideration of Croatia’s negative role in Bosnia. This negative role, most 
prominently exemplified by illicit Croatian military involvement in Bosnia, is 
supported by ICTY judgements, which show that a chain of command existed 
between the Croatian government in Zagreb and forces in Bosnia. Respondents, 
however, found this involvement to be unclear in comparison to the positive forms of 
intervention in the conflict and, at least with the respondents in this study, the ICTY 
judgements seem to have not much affected how they constructed their understanding 
of the conflict. 
The various target segments in the study constructed the narrative of Croatian 
involvement in Bosnia in a similar way. All groups stressed the same themes in much 
the same manner. The key difference concerned the perceptions of negative Croatian 
involvement. War veterans and two groups of pensioners did not mention this at all, 
while all the teachers and the other two groups of pensioners did at least remark upon 
it, although with much relativisation and only after much probing. This is, however, 
significant since it does allow alternative discursive options a space to exist within the 
consensus interpretation of events, whereas the veterans’ and pensioners’ lack of 
acknowledgment of the negative aspects of Croatian involvement suggests a 
discursive monopoly about the conflict. Further, representative study will be required 
to ascertain why the former groups may be deliberating on issues while others are not, 
although levels of education and age cohort may be key. Moreover, for the war 
veterans, the potential of ‘incriminating’ the war narrative also holds the possibility 
that their understandings of their own selves will be ‘incriminated’. 
Croatian elite narratives about the Bosnian conflict and the Croatian 
involvement in it are reflected in everyday narratives. The narrative propagated by 
transitional justice authorities, on the other hand, has had little effect. Causality is 
difficult to ascertain and it is impossible to tell whether the elite narrative sets the 
terms of the everyday one or vice versa. What is clear is that the facets of the Bosnian 
conflict, as well as court decisions more broadly, which work in concert with the 
dominant war narrative resonate more powerfully with individuals. The declarations 
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certainly add expressive weight to a preferred version of history, and whilst they do 
not penalise the expression of contrary views, they confer normative obligations on 
individuals. In other words, they seem to define the framework within which these 
discussions take place. 
The elite and everyday narratives, therefore, generally overlap and work in 
concert with each other. They both broadly deny negative Croatian involvement, they 
both claim that Croatia saved Bosnia, and they both lie within the framework of 
nesting orientalism, in which Croatia is seen as superior to Bosnia. They diverge in 
the manner in which these points of emphasis are effected. The elite narrative stresses, 
first and foremost, the notion of benevolent paternalism. It is an instrumentalised 
narrative and a remnant of the politics of the 1990s, which aimed to subsume parts of 
Bosnia within Croatia. The everyday narrative, by contrast, achieves this reduction by 
painting Bosnia as savage. This characterisation helps define Croatian conceptions of 
itself within Europe, but it does not imply subsumption. 
These results raise further questions that are outside of the scope of this study. 
For example, why have the ICTY and transitional justice authorities not had more of 
an influence? Is there a collective ignorance or amnesia towards these issues and, if 
so, what can now be done to reverse this trend? The study does, at the very least, hint 
at a collective avoidance of the topic, especially with the two older target segments 
who were more involved in the conflict, many of whom still relive their memories of 
the war on a daily basis. Focus groups are an excellent method of data-gathering for 
this type of inquiry, especially when they generate sequences to analyse. In this 
instance, however, they can also be limiting, since the topic was so often met with 
brief responses, if any at all. Silences, pauses, and brief responses are in themselves 
fruitful material for analysis, but they can also limit the benefits of focus-group 
research. The topic would, nevertheless, benefit from a complementary approach (for 
example, in-depth interviews or ethnographic study) that would allow for more 
expansion on key topics. Moreover, these results are only indicative and require 
support from larger, quantitative research, which can help show how the broader 
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